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I. INTRODUCTION
As the twenty-first century begins, the international human rights system
faces a profound anomaly. Despite enormous normative and institutional
achievements,' the system seems incapable of delivering its ultimate promise to
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. LLM., Harvard
University Law School; J.D., Rutgers University Law School (Camden); B.A., Kalamazoo College. I
sincerely thank our five incredible guests, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Dean Claudio Grossman, President Oscar
Arias, President Jean-Paul Aristide, and Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, and my inestimable colleague
Professor James Wilets, for making the 2000 Goodwin Seminar a truly remarkable learning experience.
I. Among the hundreds of international human rights instruments promulgated under United
Nations authority since 1945, there are at least seven major multilateral treaties with over one hundred state
parties each. International conventions on Civil and Political Rights, Economic and Social Rights, Genocide,
Racial Discrimination, Women, Torture and Children have 142, 144, 130, 156, 165, 119, and 191 state parties,
respectively. See The United Nations Treaty Collection, at
http://www.un.orgDepts/Treaty/finalts2newfileslparLbooliv -ll.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2001); Millennium
Summit Multilateral Framework: An Invitation to Universal Participation, U.N. Doc. DPI/2130 (2000),
available at http://untreaty.un.orgFEnglish/ millennium/law/index.html. There are also three comprehensive
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those who need it most.2 A comprehensive, albeit underdeveloped,3 network of
lofty norms has been created, theoretically binding governments to follow a
universal moral code. An almost bewildering array of institutional mechanisms,
although virtually invisible to most of humanity, is set in place to supervise and
monitor implementation of these collective aspirations.4 Well-financed,
nongovernmental organizations, devoted to the enforcement of rights, have
gained the ears of international institutions and governments alike, exposing
violations and working tirelessly for change.5 Even the politically cynical and
formerly stodgy United Nations Security Council has significantly raised the
profile of human rights, justifying a series of interventions based upon a
perceived connection between human rights and threats to peace.6 Perhaps most
dramatically, the international community has begun to take leadership
accountability more seriously, endorsing the use of criminal sanctions, both
domestic and international, to bring human rights violators to justice.7 Human
rights have, in essence, become a critical part of international relations. More
importantly, they have become a dynamic force for change that provides hope
for millions of oppressed people around the world.
regional human rights treaties covering a wide variety of human rights concerns in Europe, Africa, and the
Americas. See generally GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE chs. 7-9 (Hurst Hannum ed.,
Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational, 3d ed. 1999); HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAw, POLITICS, MORALS ch. 10 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
2. Professors Heifer and Slaughter have perceptively described the "sad paradox" that human rights
institutions are "most effective" in the states that "arguably need them the least: those whose officials commit
relatively few, minor, and discrete human rights violations." Lawrence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE LJ. 273 (1997).
3. Although the international system has developed a comprehensive network of human rights
norms, the manifestation of many human rights is still nascent and their specific meaning unsettled. See
Douglas Lee Donoho, The Role of Human Rights in Global Security Issues: A Normative and Institutional
Critique, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L 827, 837-43, 847-50 (1993); Henry Steiner, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L.
603, 604-05 (1990) (reviewing THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUrSHELL
(1988)). Thus, the specific meaning of many human rights remains underdeveloped. Reasons for this include
the relative newness of the norms and the international system's limited capacity for rendering authoritative
interpretations of rights. Donoho, supra at 866-68.
4. In addition to United Nations Charter based institutions such as the Commission on Human
Rights, each of the three existing regional systems and six of the major multilateral human rights treaties have
enforcement mechanisms in the form of monitoring institutions and, in some cases, judicial or quasi-judicial
procedures. See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note I; THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Philip Alston ed. 1992).
5. See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at ch. 8.
6. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations' Response to the
Disruption of Democracy, 29 CORNELL INT'L LI. 329, 331,351 n. 117, 358-70, 375-76 (1996); Ruth Gordon,
United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519
(1994).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 32-39.
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Yet, despite these advances and so many reasons for hope, the world
remains mired in widespread and profound violations of human dignity.
Despite the world's collective mantra "never again," genocidal episodes have
repeatedly marred the consciousness of human kind since World War I1.'
Floods of refugees, and newly refined forms of oppression such as "ethnic
cleansing," have challenged the international community's capacity to respond.
Grotesque forms of physical abuse, such as torture and summary execution,
continue to haunt many societies and despite a tide of democratic transitions
around the world, violations of basic civil liberties remain commonplace.9 Most
disheartening of all, the two greatest enemies of human dignity, armed conflict
and poverty, persistently plague the vast majority of human kind.'°
Responding to these sober realities while embracing our many reasons for
hope, the Law Center chose to focus the 2000 Goodwin Seminar on human
8. The persistence of genocidal episodes prompted Michael Scharf's wry observation that:
[The pledge of "never again" quickly became the reality of "again and again" as the
world community failed to take action to bring those responsible to justice when 4
million people were murdered during Stalin's purges (1937-1953); 5 million were
annihilated during China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976); 2 million were butchered
in Cambodia's killing fields (1975-1979); 30,000 disappeared during Argentina's Dirty
War (1976-1983); 200,000 were massacred in East Timor (1975-1985); 750,000 were
exterminated in Uganda (1971-1987); 100,000 Kurds were gassed in Iraq (1987-1988);
and 75,000 peasants were slaughtered by death squads in El Salvador (1980-1992).
Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes Trial
Since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L REv. 861. 861-62 (1997). Scharf might have also mentioned mass killings in
Nigeria (Biafra, 1966-1971), Bangladesh (1970-1971), Burundi, and Sudan. See Robert Melson, The
Holocaust: Remembering for the Future: Paradigms of Genocide: The Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide,
and Contemporary Mass Destruction, 548 ANNALS 1 56 (1996). The most recent examples, of course, are the
tragic events in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. The dramatic difference in the international community's
response to these more recent events is cause for optimism. Freed of cold-war constraints, the international
community's reactions to Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, although flawed and somewhat halting, were
ultimately decisive.
9. " See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL U.S.A., The Campaign to Stop Torture, at
http://www.amnesty-usa.org/stoptoture/; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2001 World Report, available at
http://www.hrw.orgtwr2kl/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2001); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, at http://www.state.govlgldrlrlslhrrpt2000/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2001); see also
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human _rights/hrpreports-mainhp.html.
10. See, e.g., SIPRIYEARBOOK 1998: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
(Oxford Univ. Press 1998), at http://editors.sipri.se/ pubs/yb98/chl.htrnl (surveying armed conflicts around
the world); UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN FUND, The State of the World's Children 2001, available at
http://www.unicef.orgtsowcOl/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2001) (describing, among other things, the effects of
armed conflict on children, estimating that conflicts during the last decade have left two million dead, between
six and eight million children seriously injured, and twelve million children homeless). For detailed reports
surveying world poverty and efforts to eliminate it, see UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, Poverty
Report 2000, available at http://www.undp.org/poverty/ publications/ and WORLD BANK POVERTY NET,
available at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty.
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rights, peace, and democracy in the twenty-first century. Through the
generosity of the Leo Goodwin, Sr. Foundation, the Law Center hosted the
following five distinguished visitors over the course of our semester long
seminar: Dean Claudio Grossman, Judge Gabriel Kirk McDonald, Dr. Hanan
Ashrawi, President Jean Paul Aristide, and Nobel Peace Laureate President
Oscar Arias." These distinguished visitors brought to the Law Center a wealth
of profound personal and professional experience in the front line struggle for
human rights. For each vistor, the quest for human rights has been a lifelong
commitment. The visitors spent several days at the Law Center, teaching,
listening, and sometimes debating with students and faculty about the current
status of human rights and their potential for realization in the twenty-first
century.
The discourse prompted by our distinguished guests covered a wide array
of current human rights issues ranging from the Middle East peace process,
international criminal law, transitions to democracy and reconciliation, the
future of the Inter-American system, disarmament, and debt relief. Despite the
breadth of the subjects discussed, and the diversity of opinions expressed, a
clear set of central themes emerged. These inter-related themes focused steadily
on the future of human rights and the various ways in which politics,
economics, power, and oppression are entangled in the struggle to achieve basic
human dignity for all. While some of these themes are clearly expressed in the
essays prepared by our guests for publication in this volume, others emerged
only in classrooms, in offices, and over dinner tables. They involve both
insights regarding the causes of continuing human rights violations and
speculations regarding the next phase in a movement that has bettered the lives
of millions, yet fallen frustratingly short of its objectives. What follows is a
brief description of the four most significant themes that emerged from the
seminar and some observations regarding each one.
II. THEMES FROM THE 2000 GOODWIN SEMINAR
A. There is a Profound Relationship Between Peace, Democracy, and
Human Rights
The notion that human rights, democracy, and peace are profoundly
interrelated was a consistent theme of each Goodwin visitor. For each, this
central belief is one founded on personal experience. President Arias, for
example, was awarded the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize for his work nurturing this
11. For pertinent biographical information regarding these five distinguished guests, see James D.
Wilets, The Building Blocks to Recognition of Human Rights And Democracy: Reconciliation, Rule of Law,
and Domestic and International Peace, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & CoM. L 825 (2001), 25 NOVAL. REV. 387 (2001).
relationship into concrete results during the Central American Peace Process. "
For both President Aristide and Dr. Ashrawi, the complex dynamics of armed
conflict, violence, oppression, and the hope for human rights and democracy
pose a continuing daily struggle. 3 Dean Grossman spoke poignantly of his
bitter experience watching from forced exile as General Pinochet dismantled a
proud Chilean tradition of democracy and systematically violated the basic
rights of all those who opposed him. Judge McDonald presided over the
creation and development of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, an institution whose very existence was founded on the premise
that human rights violations may constitute a threat to international peace.'
4
The idea that peace, democracy, and human rights are interdependent is not
a novel idea. Indeed, Immanuel Kant suggested such a connection in 1795,
when he argued international peace is tied to democracy." In recent years,
international institutions increasingly sounded this message, often justifying
international initiatives on this basis. The United Nations, for example, engaged
considerable resources in the promotion of democracy, including extensive
election monitoring. 6 The United Nations Security Council increasingly relied
on human rights concerns in finding threats to peace, justifying interventionist
activities believed unthinkable just a decade earlier.'7 The Security Council's
unprecedented decision to authorize the use of force to restore democracy in
12. See John J. Moore, Jr., Note, Problems with Forgiveness: Granting Amnesty Under the Arias
Plan in Nicaragua and El Salvador, 43 STAN. L REv. 733, 735, 738-45 (1991) (providing a detailed
description of the Arias Plan and the role of President Arias in the peace process).
13. See, e.g., Edward Cody, Haiti Torn by Hope and Hatred as Aristide Returns to Power, WASH.
POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at A 1; Mike Williams, Aristide Takes Office, Calls for Peace: Poor in Haiti Joyous, but
Foes Ready to Act, ATLANTA CONsT., Feb. 8, 2001, at 3A; Jessica Berry, Women: Five and Kicking, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 8, 1996, at '17; Associated Press, Arafat Critic Demands "Genuine Democracy," CHa. TRIB.,
Aug. 13, 1998, at N 17; flene R. Prusher, Why a Human Rights Advocate Leaves Arafat's Cabinet: Real Issues
of Reform "Not Addressed," CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNITOR, Aug. 31, 1998, at 8.
14. S.C.Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); infra text
accompanying notes 32-35.
15. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLmIcS, HISTORY, AND MORALS
107 (Ted Humphrey, trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1983); see also Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian Theory
of International Law, 92 COLUM. L REV. 53,53 n.1 (1992).
16. See Donoho, supra note 6, at 333-40; see generally David Stoelting, The Challenge of UN-
Monitored Elections in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L 371 (1992).
17. See S.C.Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991) (implicit
authorization of force to protect Iraqi Kurds); S.C.Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/794 (1992) (intervention in Somalia to prevent humanitarian crisis, including force); S.C.Res. 770,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992) ("all necessary means" to deliver aid in
Bosnia); S.C.Res. 940 U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) (restoration of
democracy in Haiti by "all necessary means"); S.C.Res. 929 U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392nd mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/929 (1994) (safe zones in Rwanda); S.C.Res. 1262, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4038th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1262 (1999) (East Timor); Donoho, supra note 6; Gordon, supra note 6.
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Haiti is perhaps the clearest example of this promising new trend.' 8 Most
recently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") justified its forceful
interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo on essentially this rationale. 9
Although widely articulated, the actual relationship between human rights,
peace, and democracy is rarely examined critically.' One certainty is that
armed conflict is perhaps the greatest single source of human rights violations.
It also seems plausible that genuine democracy lessens the potential for
egregious human rights violations, violent internal conflict, and the aggressive
use of armed force.2' The available empirical evidence to assist in the inquiry
is, however, limited and controversial, making it difficult to assess the
implications of this perceived relationship with any degree of certainty.
Often, even the most basic questions are never asked. Do violations of
human rights cause breaches of peace, or are such violations merely
symptomatic of deeper economic and social conflicts? Do we mean that respect
for human rights is an important precondition for peace, or only that peace itself
is a prerequisite to the effective protection of rights? Does democratic
governance actually reduce the potential for international armed conflict?22
Does democracy, often itself promoted as a basic human right,' serve as an
important precondition to the ultimate realization of human rights and, in turn,
peace? If so, would not the absence of democracy justify forceful intervention
or other drastic measures aimed at nondemocratic United Nations members,
including the Peoples Republic of China?
While all seem to agree that the relationship between peace, human rights,
and democracy is vital, the precise nature of this relationship and its
implications remain somewhat elusive and dependent upon the speaker's
perspective and agenda. One of the clearest lessons that emerged over the
course of the Goodwin Seminar is that the relationship between peace,
democracy, and human rights is far more complex than the lofty platitudes that
typically emerge from such discussions. Beleaguered on all sides by class
18. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994). But see Donoho,
supra note 6, at 370-82.
19. See generally Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism ": Promise or Peril, 9
J. TRANSNAT'L L & PoL.153 (1999).
20. See Valerie Epps, Peace and Democracy: The Link and the Policy Implications, 4 ELSA J. INt'L
& COM. L. 347, 350 (1998) (discussing some of the empirical studies of the Kantian thesis and pointing out
some of the difficult uncertainties).
21. Id. at348.
22. Even studies that have suggested that liberal democracies that do not fight each other have
acknowledged that many democratic states commonly employ armed forces internationally. See id. The most
obvious example of this phenomenon is, of course, the United States.
23. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L 46, 53-56 (1992); Gregory Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L
L. 539 (1992).
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violence, rampant poverty and economic disparity, President Aristide must
continually wrestle with the complex realities of nurturing an infant democracy
in the context of oppressive social and economic conditions. President
Aristide's frustrated efforts to build Haiti's fledgling democracy under these
oppressive conditions demonstrate that genuine democracy cannot exist, and
will not contribute to the protection of basic rights, absent the material
conditions necessary for its development.2 4
Similarly, Dr. Ashrawi has witnessed her aspirations for meaningful
democratic self-governance for Palestinians sacrificed in the quest for "security"
and peace with the oppressor. While Dr. Ashrawi steadfastly argued that peace
is impossible without full respect for human rights, she readily acknowledged
that the struggle for independence has itself caused the Palestinian people some
self-inflicted wounds. Moreover, fundamental lingering conflicts over scarce
land, power, and security raise unanswered questions regarding which rights and
whose rights must be protected and under what conditions. Palestinians and
Israelis alike find themselves locked in circular political rhetoric over human
rights. There can be no peace, without security, no security without peace, no
human rights without peace and no peace without human rights. The rhetoric
of conflict has thus obscured the underlying premise that respect for human
rights on all sides is a prerequisite for meaningful negotiations and the
compromises necessary to peaceful coexistence.
In this regard, Presidents Aristide and Arias both astutely argued that
economic justice was an essential prerequisite for peace, human rights and the
development of real democracy. Yet, even this appealing insight arguably holds
human rights hostage to the political realities of scarce resources and global
concentrations of economic power. It gives rise to the reasonable suspicion that
the most significant factor in the relationship between human rights, peace, and
democracy has yet to be clearly identified. Perhaps the clearest message of all
is that economic justice and development must figure more prominently in our
thinking about peace, democracy, and human rights.
B. The International Community Must Identify and Address Systemic Causes
of Human Rights Violations such as Poverty, Economic Disparity, Debt
Burden, and Militarization
A recurring concern raised during the symposium was that the international
community has failed to adequately identify and respond to systemic causes of
human rights violations. Ironically, the dramatic rise in human rights
consciousness among governments has not been accompanied by similarly
24. See Cody, supra note 13. Williams, supra note 13; Berry, supra note 13; Associated Press, supra
note 13, Prusher, supra note 13.
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dramatic improvements in the lives of most people. The World Bank estimates
that four billion people live on less than two dollars per day.25 United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates that three billion people live in abject
poverty without basic sanitation, health care, shelter, potable water, education,
or adequate food, including two million children who die each year from
diarrhea.26 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
there are currently over twenty-two million displaced persons and refugees
around the world, living in desperate conditions. 27 Recognizing this painful
reality, the Goodwin visitors challenged us to think broadly and critically about
the primary causes of human suffering when considering the future of human
rights.
These leaders encouraged us to look beyond our Western preoccupation
with individual liberties and take into account the physical and material
conditions that fundamentally inhibit the realization of human dignity for most
of the world's population. Our visitors' experiences in the struggle for human
rights and peace convincingly demonstrate that economics and development
must play a fundamental role in the achievement of human dignity for all.
Extreme poverty, economic disparity and lack of basic development are
undisputedly the most fundamental sources of suffering on the planet. They are
also, perhaps, the greatest existing obstacles to the ultimate realization of
fundamental human rights for all.
As witnessed by President Aristide's struggles in Haiti, economic disparity
and deprivation undermine the foundations for genuine democracy and inhibit
the social conditions that make respect and enjoyment of basic civil liberties
possible. It seems equally clear that the material conditions within societies
frequently serve as the catalyst for abusive exercises of authoritarian power and
misguided governmental priorities that commit poor nations' scarce resources
to ever increasing militarization. Armed conflict and internal civil strife, rooted
in social and political power struggles over the material aspects of life, are
undeniably powerful catalysts for human rights violations.
Thus, while human rights are linked to peace and democracy, attaining
meaningful peace and democracy depends, in turn, on addressing economic
disparity and lack of development. President Aristide's entire life, from priest
to politician, has been premised on this conception of the role of economic
justice in the realization of human rights and dignity. His experiences in Haiti
25. WORLD BANK POVERTY NET, supra note 10.
26. See United Nations Children's Fund, Change the World with Children, available at
http://www.unicef.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2001). See also Peadar Kirby, Poverty is the Ultimate Threat
to Global Security, THE IRISHTIMES, Dec. 28, 2000, at 61 (describing the worsening income gap between rich
and poor).
27. See U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR Statistics, at http://www.unhcr.ch/
statist/main.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2001).
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demonstrate the complex and stubborn nature of the problem. President Arias
has similarly taken these insights seriously, campaigning for a fundamental shift
in governmental priorities in developed and underdeveloped countries alike.
Recognizing the significance of economic development to human rights, he has
championed the idea that demilitarization and serious debt relief are necessary
for critical economic development and ultimately the realization of fundamental
human rights.2"
Despite noble beginnings and recent advances,29 the profound connection
between economic deprivation and human rights has not figured prominently
in Western human rights agendas. 30  Rather, Western governments and
nongovernmental organizations have focused their resources on protection of
civil liberties, largely ignoring or discounting the underlying material causes of
human rights deprivations. It is tragically ironic that the Western human rights
movement has seemingly failed to recognize persistent and widespread poverty,
which denies vast segments of the world's population the material needs
essential to human dignity, thus making the meaningful enjoyment of our
treasured civil liberties virtually impossible.
C. The Effective Protection of Human Rights Requires the Development of
Stable, Independent Domestic Civic Institutions, and a Culture of Democracy
Born from personal, sometimes painful and bitter, experience our Goodwin
visitors repeatedly emphasized the significance of a strong civic infrastructure
to the creation of lasting democracy and respect for human rights. As a member
28. See Oscar Arias, What is Needed to Protect International Human Rights in the 21st Century,
7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.L 721 (2001), 25 NOVA L REv. 487 (2001); see also Eric A. Friedman, Debt Relief
in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. LJ. 191 (2000); Oxfarn International,
Debt Relief at http://www.oxfam.orgladvocacy/debt (last visited Mar. 21, 2001) (describing some of the
effects of a $2000 Billion debt burden has on developing countries); JUBILEE 2000 COALITION, A Debt Free
Start for a Billion People, at http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/index (last visited Mar. 21, 2001) (asserting that
seven million children die each year as a result of the debt crisis).
29. See, e.g., Frank E.L Deale, The Unhappy History of Economic Rights in the United States and
Prospects for Their Creation and Renewal, 43 How. LJ. 281, 305-306 (2000) (describing how economic
rights were a central theme in the policies and public pronouncements of President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
30. The United States government, for example, has traditionally taken the position that economic,
social, and cultural rights are not really rights at all, or at least are not enforceable as such. Most human rights
nongovernmental organizations have also been reluctant to place economic rights on their agendas. See, e.g.,
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1. at 267-70. International institutions such as the United Nations
Development Program and the World Bank have, however, taken the problem of poverty seriously. See Cody,
supra note 13; Williams, supra note 13; Berry, supra note 13; Associated Press, supra note 13; Prnsher, supra
note 13; see also Chris Jochnick & Javier Mujica Petit, Preface to the Quito Declaration on the Enforcement
and Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. LJ. 209 (1999); see generally Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for
International Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L REv. 1425 (2000).
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of Salvadore Allende's administration in Chile, Dean Grossman watched as
Pinochet' s bloody regime systematically dismantled the Chilean judicial system
and other institutions of democracy. Dr. Ashrawi spoke of the dilemmas of
institution building in the context of oppression, under which Palestinians face
both internal and external threats to their basic dignity. Perhaps most
dramatically, President Aristide has witnessed firsthand, from coup to current
turmoil, how fragile democracy is in the absence of strong civic institutions and
the material conditions that nurture their growth.
The importance of institution building has not been lost on the United
Nations or in academic literature.31 The personal experiences of our Goodwin
visitors, however, brought the complexity of this mission into clear focus. If
strong civic institutions provide a bulwark against human rights violations, then
economic progress, a culture of democracy, respect for the rule of law, and the
development of "rights consciousness," provide the foundation upon which such
institutions are built. The effectiveness of such institutions is effectively tied to
the dynamics of economic and power relations within society.
The bitter experiences of our distinguished guests dramatically demonstrate
that civic institutions and frameworks for rights protections are the first to be
sacrificed under the yoke of oppression. In Haiti, for example, recent events
show that much more effort and work is necessary for the establishment of
meaningful democracy and respect for human rights than United States
sponsored elections. The struggle for basic human dignity continues in Haiti
with little improvement, because the primary economic and power dynamics of
oppression have remained largely unaltered. Economic development and justice
have proven no more than empty promises, and a fundamental absence of
adequate civic institutions remains unremedied. How to create and maintain
effective institutions in the face of oppressive conditions and lingering internal
conflict remains a mystery despite its importance. Moreover, it seems clear that
institution building, while a necessary ingredient for the effective protection of
human rights, is wholly inadequate in the absence of critical economic and
political reforms addressing the underlying sources of conflict.
D. A Meaningful Commitment to Leadership Accountability is Essential to
Elimination of Human Rights Atrocities
A fourth recurring theme raised by the Goodwin visitors involved the
significance of leadership accountability for human rights violations. Perhaps
31. Heifer and Slaughter, for example, cite the existence of strong, independent domestic
institutions, committed to the rule of law and responsive to individual claimants, as a "strongly favorable pre-
condition for effective supranational adjudication." Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 333-34; see also
linda Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good
Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.. 1 (2000).
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one of the most significant human rights developments at the close of this
century has been the increasing willingness of governments to abandon outdated
notions of immunity that have for too long served as the refuge of oppression.
When discussing the vital issue of human rights enforcement, our guests
inevitably referenced three recent developments: the creation of ad hoc war
crimes tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the movement to create a
permanent international criminal court, and the extradition case against General
Pinochet. These three developments arguably signal a profound shift in the
traditional paradigm of anemic international human rights enforcement limited
to toothless monitoring and supervision. More importantly, they may also
signal a change in the attitudes of states regarding the personal accountability
of political leadership for egregious violations of human rights.
The United Nations Security Council's creation of ad hoc war crimes
tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda under Chapter VII, and its endorsement of
their wide mandate, may represent the first wave in this shifting paradigm of
human rights enforcement.32 Indeed, the creation of the tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, presided over in its infancy by Judge McDonald, and the
subsequent creation of the tribunal for Rwanda, are perhaps the most profound
developments in human rights enforcement since Nuremberg. The very
existence of these tribunals is premised upon the importance of imposing
criminal accountability on impugned leadership. Each tribunal has sought to
indict and bring to justice, not only rogue actors in the field, but more
importantly, the leadership that directed and nurtured human terror in those
tortured lands. Thanks to pioneers like Judge McDonald, the tribunals have
broken new ground in the development of international criminal law, not only
generating a sophisticated jurisprudence regarding criminal liability for human
rights violations, but also establishing rational rules of procedure and important
substantive expansions of basic humanitarian norms.33 Most importantly, the
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33. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES1872 (1993)
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tribunals' work has enormously increased public awareness and established a
new vision of what is possible in human rights enforcement. The international
community did not, for once, simply sit by and watch with horror as thousands
were murdered, enslaved, tortured, and systematically raped. Whatever their
flaws,' the work of these tribunals has begun to dismantle outdated attitudes
regarding the accountability of leadership and set important new limits on what
will be tolerated.
The ultimate significance of the tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda is,
however, somewhat constrained by their ad hoc nature and limited geographic
and temporal jurisdiction.35 As eloquently argued by Judge McDonald, the
momentum gained through the tribunals' work must be carried to full fruition
by the implementation of the permanent International Criminal Court proposed
in the Treaty of Rome. 3' The creation of this court may signal that the
international community, some fifty years after Nuremberg and the birth of the
modem human rights system, has finally developed the resolve necessary to
make human rights enforcement meaningful.
The extradition case against General Pinochet, the significance of which
has yet to be fully realized, reflects a potential third wave in this shifting
paradigm.37 Although ultimately frustrating, the British court's courageous
decision denying Pinochet traditional immunity potentially represents an
enormously positive development. Among other things, this decision may
reflect an increasing willingness by states to recognize the applicability of
domestic criminal processes and universal jurisdiction to human rights
violators .3  Although potentially a vital development, the ultimate significance
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of the Pinochet case depends on the political will of individual governments to
employ their domestic processes.39 One can only hope it signals the repudiation
of an era of impunity and gives fresh life to the admonition that barbaric
violators of human rights are "hostis humani generis," enemies of all human
kind.
Taken together, these developments hopefully reflect a wise shift away
from immunity toward individual accountability for human rights violations.
Carried to their full implications, they may signal a final assault on the citadel
of immunity and, eliminating safe havens for the oppressor, send a clear
message that justice will be served. 4°
II. CONCLUSION
The 2000 Goodwin visitors brought to the Law Center profound insights
regarding the future of human rights in the twenty-first century. Their
willingness to explore these complex and fundamental issues, and to share their
collective wisdom borne of experience, brightened all of our horizons and
helped rekindle our commitment to effective realization of human rights for all
people everywhere.
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